

Directional Overcurrent Relaying (67) Concepts

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Abstract – Directional overcurrent relaying (67) refers to relaying that can use the phase relationship of voltage and current to determine direction to a fault. There are a variety of concepts by which this task is done. This paper will review the mainstream methods by which 67 type directional decisions are made by protective relays. The paper focuses on how a numeric directional relay uses the phase relationship of sequence components such as positive sequence (V_1 vs. I_1), negative sequence (V_2 vs. I_2), and zero sequence (V_0 vs. I_0) to sense fault direction, but other concepts such as using quadrature voltage (e.g., V_{AB} vs I_C) are included.

Index Terms: directional relaying, sequence component, negative sequence, zero sequence, 67, 32, quadrature voltage.

I. INTRODUCTION

In some medium voltage distribution lines and almost all high voltage transmission lines, a fault can be in two different directions from a relay, and it can be highly desirable for a relay to respond differently for faults in the forward or reverse direction. The IEEE device number used to signify a directional element is either a 21 (impedance element, based on $Z=V/I$, and having a distance to fault capability) or a 67 (directional overcurrent, generally based on the phase relationship of V and I , with no distance to fault capability). Some applications also might use a 32 (power element, based on $P=\text{Re}[V \times I^*]$) for directional control, though in some circumstances a 32 element may not be a good indication of direction to fault. This paper will review some of the various implementations of 67 elements as found in electromechanical, solid state, and numeric (i.e., multifunction programmable logic microprocessor based) relays.

II. CLASSICAL CONCEPTS FOR DIRECTIONAL ANALYSIS

The classic electromechanical and solid state relay, as well as some common numeric relays, determines the direction to fault by comparing the phase angle relationship of phase currents to phase voltages. If only per phase watt flow (32 element) is to be considered, the basic concept would be that if I_{Ph} is in phase with V_{Ph-N} (0° , $\pm 90^\circ$), then power flow on that phase is indicated as forward (or reverse, depending on one's perspective). However, for a phase to ground fault, the V_{Ph-N} may collapse to 0, and I may be highly lagging, so that $V_{Ph-N} \times I_{Ph}$ may be mostly VAR flow, and thus prevent the relay from making a correct directional decision. To resolve the low voltage issue, quadrature voltages (i.e., V_{BC} vs. I_A) are commonly used. To resolve the issue that fault current is typically highly lagging, the relay current vs. voltage detection algorithm is skewed so that the relay is optimized to detect

lagging current conditions rather than 1.0 power factor conditions. One approach, seen in Fig. 1, is to phase shift the voltage signal so that the relay's internal voltage signal ($V_{Polarity}$, abbreviated as V_{Pol}) is in phase with current when current lags the 1.0 power factor condition by some setting, typically between 30° and 90° . The angle setting is commonly referred to as the maximum torque angle, MTA. In some designs of this concept, the current signal is skewed rather than the voltage signal. In some designs, other phase voltages are used. For instance, I_A could be compared to V_{AB} , V_{CA} , V_{BN} , or V_{CN} , and the detection algorithm would work, though the quadrature voltage V_{BC} gives the most independence of the voltage signal from the effects of an A-N, A-B, or A-C fault.




Fig. 1. Classic $V_{Quadrature}$ Directional Element

The response of the design to a phase to ground and phase to phase fault is shown in Fig. 2. The response to a phase to ground fault is fairly apparent because the quadrature voltages are assumed to be relatively unaffected by the faulted phase currents. However, for a phase to phase fault, the quadrature

voltages are affected. The effect is difficult to give in text. One should study the diagram to develop an understanding. Basically, in the ph-ph fault, relative to ph-ground fault, note that both $V_{\text{quadrature}}$ and I_{fault} have shifted by 30° , so there is no net change in tendency of the element to operate.




Fig. 2. Phasors in Classical $V_{\text{Quadrature}}$ Directional Element

The MTA setting is commonly thought of in terms of the forward-looking line impedance angle. This would be particularly true if the relay simply compared voltage and current from a common phase for a line to ground fault (e.g., I_A is compared to V_{AN}). In this case, the relay is sensing Z_A between the relay and the fault. However, when quadrature voltage is used, then V_{Pol} is somewhat independent of the fault current, especially for a phase to ground fault. The angle by which current lags quadrature voltage is a factor of both source impedance as well as forward-looking line impedance, so a compromise value is utilized. An MTA in the range of 30° to 75° is common. When setting MTA, if an overcurrent element is to be set below reverse direction load current, there is a risk of the element seeing abnormal forward load

conditions as reverse fault current, as seen in Fig. 3. An approach to addressing this condition is to set the MTA to 30° or less, so that the reverse zone reaches minimally into the forward zone.




Fig. 3. Power Flow vs. MTA

III. SYMMETRICAL COMPONENTS FOR DIRECTIONAL ANALYSIS

Many modern microprocessor relays use the angular relationships of symmetrical component currents and voltages and the resultant angular nature of Z_1 , Z_2 , and Z_0 as calculated from $V_{\text{phase}}/I_{\text{phase}}$ to determine direction to fault. These three impedances are used to create, respectively, three directional assessments, 67_{POS} , 67_{NEG} , and 67_{ZERO} , that are used in relay logic in various ways by each manufacturer. There are variations among manufacturers on of how one senses the angular relationships and, in most cases since the angular relationship is the only concern, the magnitude is not calculated. The common concept is that in faulted conditions there is an approximate 180° difference of calculated Z_1 , Z_2 and Z_0 for faults in the two directions from the relay location. This high variation in phase angle is a reliable indication of direction to fault.

As described in detail in reference [1], the three phase voltage drop equation for a system that can be represented by voltages at two defined locations, (V_{Sys} and V_{Fault} in this example) is

$$\begin{bmatrix} V_{A,\text{Sys}} \\ V_{B,\text{Sys}} \\ V_{C,\text{Sys}} \end{bmatrix} - \begin{bmatrix} V_{A,\text{Fault}} \\ V_{B,\text{Fault}} \\ V_{C,\text{Fault}} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} Z_{AA} & Z_{AB} & Z_{AC} \\ Z_{BA} & Z_{BB} & Z_{BC} \\ Z_{CA} & Z_{CB} & Z_{CC} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} I_A \\ I_B \\ I_C \end{bmatrix}. \quad (1)$$

Again, as discussed in [1], when the impedances are highly balanced (i.e., the diagonal self impedance elements Z_{AA} , Z_{BB} , and Z_{CC} are all one value, and all off diagonal mutual impedance elements are another value), (1) can be restated in symmetrical component quantities by the equation

$$\begin{bmatrix} V_{0,\text{Sys}} \\ V_{1,\text{Sys}} \\ V_{2,\text{Sys}} \end{bmatrix} - \begin{bmatrix} V_{0,\text{Fault}} \\ V_{1,\text{Fault}} \\ V_{2,\text{Fault}} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} Z_0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & Z_1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & Z_2 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} I_0 \\ I_1 \\ I_2 \end{bmatrix}. \quad (2)$$

In the typical power system, we can usually assume that, at the remote system, voltage has very low V_0 and V_2 , and V_1 is 1.0, or at least very close to 1.0. At the other end, the fault location, every type of fault will have differing values of V_0 , V_1 , and V_2 and will need to be calculated via means that will not be covered here (see [1]), but we know that some value exists. Hence, (2) reduces to

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ V_{1, \text{System}} \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} - \begin{bmatrix} V_{0, \text{Fault}} \\ V_{1, \text{Fault}} \\ V_{2, \text{Fault}} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} Z_0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & Z_1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & Z_2 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} I_0 \\ I_1 \\ I_2 \end{bmatrix}. \quad (3)$$

If Z_0 , Z_1 , and Z_2 are divided into two impedances as seen from the relay location (line impedance and source impedance), the net system and associated voltage drop has the appearance of Fig. 4.




Fig. 4. Single Source System with Relay

In this application, (3) can be restated as

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ V_{1, \text{Sys}} \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} - \begin{bmatrix} V_{0, \text{Fault}} \\ V_{1, \text{Fault}} \\ V_{2, \text{Fault}} \end{bmatrix} = \left(\begin{bmatrix} Z_{0, \text{Sys}} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & Z_{1, \text{Sys}} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & Z_{2, \text{Sys}} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} Z_{0, \text{Line}} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & Z_{1, \text{Line}} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & Z_{2, \text{Line}} \end{bmatrix} \right) \begin{bmatrix} I_{0, \text{Relay}} \\ I_{1, \text{Relay}} \\ I_{2, \text{Relay}} \end{bmatrix} \quad (4)$$

The voltage division of (4) allows us to calculate the voltage at the relay by starting at the fault location and working back to the system or starting at the system and working toward the fault. Since we do not know the fault voltages, we need to take the latter approach, so we can calculate relay voltage from

$$\begin{bmatrix} V_{0, \text{Relay}} \\ V_{1, \text{Relay}} \\ V_{2, \text{Relay}} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ V_{1, \text{Sys}} \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} - \begin{bmatrix} Z_{0, \text{Sys}} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & Z_{1, \text{Sys}} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & Z_{2, \text{Sys}} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} I_{0, \text{Relay}} \\ I_{1, \text{Relay}} \\ I_{2, \text{Relay}} \end{bmatrix}. \quad (5)$$

If we solve (5) for the impedances, since $V_{2, \text{Sys}} = 0$ and $V_{0, \text{Sys}} = 0$, then

$$Z_{0, \text{Relay}} = \frac{V_{0, \text{Relay}}}{I_{0, \text{Relay}}} = -Z_{0, \text{Sys}} \quad (6)$$

$$Z_{2, \text{Relay}} = \frac{V_{2, \text{Relay}}}{I_{2, \text{Relay}}} = -Z_{2, \text{Sys}}. \quad (7)$$

Note that in (6) and (7) the equations for $Z_{0, \text{Relay}}$ and $Z_{2, \text{Relay}}$, the impedance seen by the relay will be dependent solely upon the source impedance. (The dependency on source impedance might be counter-intuitive to engineers accustomed to setting impedance relays in terms of line impedances.) The angle of $Z_{0, \text{Relay}}$ and $Z_{2, \text{Relay}}$ is the source of determining the direction to a fault. For instance, in Fig. 1, a CT polarity orientation can cause the apparent Z_0 and Z_2 at the relay to either match the source impedance angle or to be inverted by 180° . The current polarity would be the signature of a fault that is either forward or reverse from the relay's location.

The apparent Z_1 at the relay will be dependent on the fault type. First, we need to define the impedance between the relay and the fault location:

$$Z_{1, \text{Line, Flt}} = Z_1 \text{ from relay to line fault location} \quad (8)$$

For a three phase fault

$$\begin{aligned} Z_{1, \text{Relay, 3 ph}} &= \frac{V_{1, \text{Relay}}}{I_{1, \text{Relay}}} = \frac{V_{1, \text{Sys}} - Z_{1, \text{Sys}} I_{1, \text{Relay}}}{\frac{V_{1, \text{Sys}}}{Z_{1, \text{Sys}} + Z_{1, \text{Line, Flt}}}} \\ &= Z_{1, \text{Line, Flt}} \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

Phase to ground and phase to phase faults are more complicated, but have a similar derivation to (9):

$$Z_{1, \text{Relay, Ph-Ph}} = Z_{0, \text{Sys}} + Z_{0, \text{Line, Flt}} + Z_{1, \text{Line, F}} + Z_{2, \text{Sys}} + Z_{2, \text{Line, Flt}} \quad (10)$$

$$Z_{1, \text{Relay, Ph-N}} = Z_{2, \text{Sys}} + Z_{1, \text{Line, Flt}} + Z_{2, \text{Line, Flt}}. \quad (11)$$

In these cases, the Z_1 measurement as seen at the relay is a mix of the various system and line impedances, but it tends to be a measure of forward looking line impedance more than source impedance, most clearly seen in (9). The impedance angle of the various components of $Z_{1, \text{Relay}}$ tend to be similar, in the area of 50° - 85° . The calculated angle of $Z_{1, \text{Relay}}$ again has a 180° phase angle reversal depending on direction to the fault, which is the signature of a fault that is either forward or reverse.

If a relay uses $Z_{1, \text{Relay}}$ for sensing direction to fault, the $Z_{1, \text{Relay}}$ measurement will see balanced load flow as an indication of the direction to fault and, hence, to turn on overcurrent elements (67/51) that are set to look in the direction of present load flow. The Z_1 that is sensed during balanced load flow conditions is a minor modification of (9):

$$Z_{1, \text{Relay}} = Z_{1, \text{Line}} + Z_{1, \text{Load}}. \quad (12)$$

The angle of Z_1 can be a poor indicator of fault location. For instance, when a customer's DG (distributed generator) exists to peak shave, it has the ability to control the power factor at the PCC (point of common coupling). Power swings that occur in post fault conditions give transient VA flow at almost any angle. On a more steady state basis, a DG that runs to keep power at the PCC near zero could cause net power factor, and hence the angle of Z_1 , to be almost any value.

Directional overcurrent relaying would not be useful in a system with only one source. A system with two sources is shown in Fig. 5. We can apply the same concepts as above to analyze the circuit. We have a fault location where there is a calculable level of sequence voltages, and system and line impedances in two directions, looking back toward the system source voltage. The same approach as in (1) to (7) can be applied to find the impedance seen by the relays at either end of the line.




Fig. 5. Two Source System

The impedance as seen by relay A will vary according to the direction to the fault. For faults on the two different sides of the breaker, the relay will sense two completely different impedances. For fault $F_{A,F}$ and $F_{A,R}$ the impedance seen by relay R_A will be:

$$\begin{aligned} Z_{0,Relay,Fault A,For} &= -Z_{0,Sys,A} \\ Z_{0,Relay,Fault A,Rev} &= 1\angle 180^\circ (-Z_{0,Sys,B} - Z_{0,Line}) \\ &= (Z_{0,Sys,B} + Z_{0,Line}) \\ Z_{2,Relay,Fault A,For} &= -Z_{2,Sys,A} \\ Z_{2,Relay,Fault A,Rev} &= 1\angle 180^\circ (-Z_{2,Sys,B} - Z_{2,Line}) \\ &= (Z_{2,Sys,B} + Z_{2,Line}) \end{aligned} \quad (13)$$

In (13), $Z_{\#,Line}$ refers to the entire line impedance. The $1\angle 180^\circ$ factor in (13) accounts for the effective change in CT polarity for faults in the reverse direction. The positive sequence impedance does not lend itself to simple equations such as (13), but for 3 phase faults and unfaulted load flow conditions

$$\begin{aligned} Z_{1,Relay,Forward,Faulted} &= Z_{1,Line,Flt} \\ Z_{1,Relay,Reverse,Faulted} &= Z_{1,Sys,A,to Fault} \\ Z_{1,Relay,Forward,Unfaulted} &= Z_{1,Line} + Z_{1,Load,B} \\ Z_{1,Relay,Reverse,Unfaulted} &= Z_{1,Sys,A} + Z_{1,Load,A} \end{aligned} \quad (14)$$

A graphical representation of the forward and reverse zones of protection can be seen in Fig. 6. The MTA is a user setting that effectively defines forward and reverse phase angles. Sensed impedance angles that are $\pm 90^\circ$ from the MTA

would fall into either the forward or reverse zone, depending on relay setup and CT connections. Note that in an impedance plot, MTA is counterclockwise from the reference R axis, as compared to the classical approach of showing I relative to V where MTA is clockwise from the reference V_A axis.





Fig. 6. Forward and Reverse Impedance Angles

As previously mentioned, the various relay manufacturers have differing ways of sensing angular relationships. The most obvious process is to measure the impedance angle and compare it to a window of the MTA $\pm 90^\circ$ as forward or reverse. There are alternate processes in use. For instance, as seen in Fig. 7, one manufacturer configures its $Z_{2,Relay}$ and $Z_{0,Relay}$ directional elements to subtract the MTA from the calculated impedance, and then find the real portion of this resultant impedance, Z_{Real} , which can be a positive or negative value. Then, Z_{Real} is compared to user settings for the decision points for forward and reverse. For the great majority of cases this gives the same result as the phase angle window.




Fig. 7. Alternate Process to Using Phase Angle

IV. VARIATIONS OF ZERO SEQUENCE DIRECTIONALITY

Zero sequence directionality has several variations. The V_0 and I_0 used in a Z_0 measurement each can be obtained from various inputs:

- V_0 as calculated from the 3 phase VT inputs
- V_0 as seen on a 4th auxiliary VT input on the relay (V_X below). This V_X input can be connected to a variety of sources, such as:
 - a broken delta VT, or
 - the neutral of an impedance grounded generator.
- I_0 as calculated from the 3 phase CT inputs.
- I_0 as seen on a 4th CT input on the relay (I_G below). This auxiliary CT input can be connected to a variety of sources, such as:
 - a window CT that wraps all 3 phases,
 - a window CT that wraps all 3 phases as well as a power carrying neutral conductor,
 - the neutral of a transformer, or
 - the neutral of a generator.

The result is that there are 5 different combinations of currents and voltages that can be used to create a directional 67_{ZERO}

The last item in Table 1 uses only current for the directional decision and is sometimes referred to as zero sequence current polarization. The MTA is always 0° . If the two currents are in phase ($\pm 90^\circ$), the fault is forward.

TABLE 1 - VARIATIONS OF ZERO SEQUENCE POLARIZATION

67 _{ZERO} Type	Quantity 1	Quantity 2
$V_0 I_0$	Calculated V_0 from phase VTs	Calculated I_0 from phase CTs
$V_0 I_G$	Calculated V_0 from phase VTs	Current on 4th CT input
$V_X I_0$	Voltage on 4th VT input	Calculated I_0 from phase CTs
$V_X I_G$	Voltage on 4th VT input	Current on 4th CT input
$I_0 I_G$	Calculated I_0 from phase CTs	Current on 4th CT input

V. OVERCURRENT AND DIRECTIONAL ELEMENT NAMES AND CONTROL

One needs to understand which directional decision controls which overcurrent element. There is no standard way to name all of the overcurrent elements that are involved. Assume for the discussion that there are 67/51P (phase), 67/51G (ground),

and 67/51Q (negative sequence) elements and similar 67/50 elements, and that each has a forward or reverse looking mode with different settings for each direction. There are three directional elements called the 67_{POS} (positive sequence), 67_{NEG} (negative sequence), and 67_{ZERO} (zero sequence) that control the 67/51 and 67/50 elements. The protective elements and their directional controls are:

A given relay may have more than one copy, or no copy, of the indicated element, and a given relay may or may not give the user direct access to 67_{POS}, 67_{NEG}, and 67_{ZERO}.

TABLE 2 - TYPICAL DIRECTIONAL ELEMENTS

67/51 Elements	67/50 Elements	Directionally Controlled by (typically)
67/51P - Forward	67/50P - Forward	67 _{POS} or 67 _{NEG} = Forward
67/51P - Reverse	67/50P - Reverse	67 _{POS} or 67 _{NEG} = Reverse
67/51G - Forward	67/50G - Forward	67 _{ZERO} or 67 _{NEG} = Forward
67/51G - Reverse	67/50G - Reverse	67 _{ZERO} or 67 _{NEG} = Reverse
67/51Q - Forward	67/50Q - Forward	67 _{NEG} = Forward
67/51Q - Reverse	67/50Q - Reverse	67 _{NEG} = Reverse

VI. OTHER ISSUES

There is a number of subtleties involved in the forward/reverse direction decision and element operation that will not be covered here. One should refer to the various relay manufacturers' instruction manuals for details on their relays' algorithms. Some issues that need to be understood that can vary by manufacturer implementation:

A. Memory Polarization

For close-in three phase faults, the voltage at the relay may fall to near 0. Due to the low voltage, the relay's 67 logic cannot be relied upon to make a correct directional analysis decision, and in some relay configurations, if the relay cannot determine forward or reverse, it does not trip at all. To address this issue, numeric relay manufacturers create a memory polarization scheme. The relay constantly is reading the present voltage and using it to create a voltage vector (V_1). If a fault occurs that suddenly drives voltage too low to be used for directional analysis, the relay reaches back to its memory and projects the past voltage vector into the present. The V_1 voltage vector change very slowly in the normal power system, so a past V_1 voltage vector is a good indication of the voltage vector that would exist if a fault had not occurred, and it is a reliable backup for directional analysis.

B. Close in to Fault Logic

When a breaker is closed into a three phase fault (i.e., grounding chains), the memory polarization scheme will not work because there is no pre-event V_1 vector for the relay to work with. The Close In To Fault logic monitors for a breaker close and enables a high set three phase non-directional overcurrent sensing circuit for a short period of time. The setting of the 50 element must be above maximum load inrush in either direction.

C. Superimposed Components

When heavy load flow occurs at the same time as a low level fault, it can confuse a directional element. This situation will be seen in the application discussed in section VIII. Some manufacturers have implemented a scheme that tries to separate out load flow currents from fault currents, using schemes referred to as superimposed components. It is similar in application to memory polarization but involves both current and voltage from the past into the present, rather than just the voltage. Assume steady state load flow conditions. Assume a sudden change, due to a fault, is seen. The relay can take the voltage and current from the past several cycles, before the fault, and project it into the present. This projected voltage and current is compared to actual faulted voltage and current. This scheme allows the fault current to be separated from the overriding load current and, hence, improve the decision about where the fault is located. The algorithms need to include intelligence and logic to differentiate normal switching events from fault events.

D. Minimum Sensitivity

A relay has limits to its sensitivity. There must be sufficient quantities of current and voltage for a directional decision. The minimum quantity varies by manufacturer. The response of the relay to low voltage or current varies, but typically, the relay will default to a “neither forward nor reverse” status if either currents or voltages are very low. In this case, each manufacturer and even each relay from a manufacturer may have a different logic on how the relay responds. There may be settings to define minimum quantities the relay needs to see and settings for how the relay responds when values are below the minimum.

E. Positive vs. Negative Torque Angles.

Each manufacturer has its own way of presenting certain data. For instance, it is counter-intuitive to some users to have negative angles as forward and positive angles as reverse, as seen in (13) and (14), so some manufacturers effectively invert the Z_2 and Z_0 forward impedance angle. Effectively, a “-1” factor is entered into the relay’s impedance angle calculations.

VII. APPLICATION NOTE 1: FORWARD POWER SUPERIMPOSED ON REVERSE FAULT

To better understand the performance of directional relaying, let us apply it to a real world situation.

Assume the 67 element in Fig. 8 is an overcurrent relay that derives its directional characteristics from negative sequence concepts. The overcurrent element in the reverse direction is set below load current in the forward direction, with the intent of being sensitive to remote utility faults. However, assume the facility generator is off line, so the natural tendency of the operators of the facility is to believe that the 67/51Reverse elements will not trip for a utility fault. However, assume that the motors are a substantial percentage of the facility loads. Now, assume a remote system line to ground fault that is slow to be cleared. Assume the fault is on a lateral and with some fault impedance, such that the feeder still carries power to the facility on the faulted phase, above the pickup of the 67/51R

phase element. Assume for simplicity of the figure that the fault is at a point such that half the system impedance is between the facility and the fault location.




Fig. 8. System One-Line

The symmetrical component network that describes the application, for an A phase to ground fault, is shown in Fig. 9. Note that the low negative sequence impedance of the motors means that the facility can be a negative sequence current source for the fault. Compare the polarity of forward current at the CT in Fig. 8 to the polarity of current flow at the dot between Z_{2T} and Z_{2SYS} in Fig. 9. The current flow at the CT in the two cases is opposite. Hence, the 67_{NEG} sees this reverse fault and turns on. The heavy current flow into the facility, meanwhile, makes the 67/51R time out to a reverse trip, even though power is flowing into the facility on all 3 phases and the generation is off-line.

In one perspective this is a very good feature. Even in the presence of large forward load flow, the fault still is seen and cleared. This might be especially good if the generator was very small and incapable of feeding significant current into the fault. However, on the other hand, with the generation off line, there was not any benefit in tripping the breaker at the PCC. One method to stop the trip is to block the 67/51R when the generation is off line, but in some applications the generation might be quite remote from the PCC, making the control scheme difficult. Another possible resolution that does not need to directly know the generator status is seen in Fig. 10, where the directional power element, 32, supervises the 67 element, blocking the 67 when power is into the facility on all three phases. However, there could be argument against this process: If the generation is in peak shaving mode and power continues to flow into the facility on all three phases during the fault, the utility must trip its breaker before the relay at the PCC will ever see the fault. A few utilities object to sequential tripping, where one relay will not see a fault until another breaker trips first.




Fig. 9. Symmetrical Component Network




Fig. 10. 32 Supervision of Sensitive 67/51P-Reverse

VIII. APPLICATION NOTE 2: APPLICATIONS THAT NEED DIFFERENT FORWARD AND REVERSE FAULT RESPONSE TIME OR SENSITIVITY AT THE PCC

A load-only facility, of course, has no need for directional current sensing. However, when generation is added to the facility, that facility, now a DG, can backfeed the utility lines. The fault current that is seen at the Point of Common Coupling (PCC) can vary hugely for faults in the DG facility that are fed by the utility and for faults in the utility that are fed by the DG. The differing current levels may require two 67 relays, or two 67 functions in one relay, each designed to respond to the appropriate fault in the two directions, each with differing overcurrent pickup and time dial settings. Further, two relays or relay functions can be used to determine appropriate response to the fault. For faults in the facility, the response should be to trip the PCC breaker, but for faults in the utility, the response might be either to trip the generation

rather than the PCC breaker, or to trip the PCC and implement some immediate remedial action scheme to help generation survive any major difference between present generator output and facility loading.

In many DG applications, the generator is intended for use in peak shaving purposes, not as a base load unit. Since generation may be off during times of high facility loading, the overcurrent relaying at the Point of Common Coupling (PCC) must be able to carry the peak loading of the facility, so its overcurrent setting is, for the purpose of discussion, 1.25 per unit, where 1 per unit is the current at peak loading of the facility. Assume a generator is obtained that is 1.0 per unit in capability, though it is common for a DG to be sized much smaller than the local load. The unit size relative to local load means that, during facility light loading times, the generator could easily carry the entire facility and the plant could even export power. However, suppose the generation is designed as a peak shaving “no reverse power flow allowed” facility; therefore, there has to be a control package for the generator that monitors the voltage, power, and VARs at the facility PCC and takes appropriate action to turn down prime mover power whenever the facility approaches the point of power export. The control system is not a protective relay, so typical engineers and utility personnel will not allow it to be relied upon to prevent an island condition. Compared to facilities where generation is always less than local load, this DG has an increased risk of supporting an island or supporting the fault condition for an extended period.

To mitigate the risk of the DG supporting an island and being slow to trip for a utility fault, the utility might ask that the DG install overcurrent relaying that can sense all faults on the line to which the DG is connected. The basic solution is to provide two back-to-back directional overcurrent relays, one looking into the DG facility (forward) and a second looking into the utility lines (reverse). However, several things may cause a determination that the reverse looking overcurrent relay will need to be set fairly sensitively. 1) The utility distribution line continues many miles farther after the DG tap, so the DG sees relatively high impedance to the fault location. 2) The utility does not allow for “sequential tripping” (i.e., the DG must see the utility line fault even when the utility is still connected and supporting the fault). 3) The utility discounts the use of generator sub-transient reactance (X_D'') and requests the use of generator steady state reactance (X_D) with no allowance for excitation boosting, so the generator fault contribution is weak on a steady state basis. These considerations, or others, result in a need to set the phase overcurrent element that looks toward the utility to below the pickup of the facility’s full load current. A possible scenario is shown in Fig. 11 where the DG is asked to trip at 0.25 pu for reverse phase-phase faults, which is much less than load current into the facility.

One concern that can be seen in this arrangement is whether forward load current might ever be seen as a reverse condition by the 67_{POS} element and lead to a subsequent misoperation. The generation in the facility might cause load current to be virtually any power factor. For example, suppose the generation output is set a little below present facility load

levels, so that net power into the facility is low, and since the facility is absorbing at least some power, there is a verification to the utility that the generator is not supporting an island. Also suppose that the generator is supplying more VARs than the local facility requires, so that the facility is shipping VARs to the utility. In this mode the facility is seen by the utility as a leading power factor load. While this would not be a normal excitation level for the generator, such a condition cannot be excluded from occurring. It also might occur during loss of an inductive load in the facility. Figs. 3 and 12 show the condition. A positive sequence directional element, 67_{POS}, is at risk of seeing current in the reverse direction for this condition.




Fig. 11. Example DG One-Line Diagram

One approach to addressing the issue described above is to set the MTA used by the 67_{POS} element to about 10^0 . This will skew the forward direction for faults to include this load flow pattern as a forward condition, and since the angle of maximum torque covers the zone of $\pm 90^0$, the relay still will be able to correctly distinguish forward and reverse fault conditions.




Fig. 12. DG S, V, Z₁ at PCC for Leading PF Condition

An alternative approach to the issue described above is to supervise the 67/51 Phase element with a 32 element, as indicated in Fig. 13. Note the 32 element is set to “3 of 3” logic. In this logic, the block occurs only if all three phases are supplying power into the DG facility. If there is a reverse fault that interrupts power flow on only one phase, then we still

want the 67/51P to operate. If the 32 element utilized “total power,” “1 of 3,” or “2 of 3,” logic, then the 32 might not drop out if there is still some level of forward power into the facility on the unfaulted phases. Also note that forward power is monitored. There might be some temptation to use the logic “If there is reverse power flow, then enable the 51P-Reverse”, but this might not be a good idea because there may be negligible power coming from the DG into a utility fault. Faults tend to be limited by line inductance and, hence, may involve large VAR flow with negligible Watt flow. Further, the DG may be a weak source, further limiting the ability of the generator to feed substantial power into a utility fault.




Fig. 13. 32 Supervision of Sensitive 67/51P-Reverse

IX. APPLICATION NOTE 3: USE OF THE 67/51 IN A LOSS OF SYNCHRONISM DETECTION SCHEME

In the recent few years there has been some attention and promotion given to requiring distributed generation to include the loss of synchronism function (alternatively referred to as an “Out of Step” relay or as “Device number 78”) in their protective relaying packages. To many engineers the ideal 78 function should be done with the classical impedance functions that monitor for relatively slow moving 3 phase faults on an R-X plane. The cost of the required relay, the cost of the engineering required to properly set the function, and various arguments that the function was not necessary, eventually led to the function being left as a suggested or “if needed” function in most regulatory and utility standards. However, if a generator does pull out of step, it is not a good situation, so it is good engineering practice to address the concern if possible. Hence, given the restraint of the ideal 78 function is not available in the relaying packages being used at one’s facility, let us see if the commonly available 27, 50, 67/50, and 51VR/VC element can be configured to respond to a loss of synchronism condition.

For a 27, 50, and 67/50 element to sense loss of synchronism, we have to assume the event actually occurs; we cannot predict it is about to occur, as might be possible with impedance elements. To sense the condition, we want to configure these elements to look for the low voltages, high currents, and high currents in an abnormal direction that might occur when the generator goes 180^0 out of phase with the system. There are notable issues, as we will see below, with using a 27 or non directional 50 element. A 67/50 element may be the most capable method, with augmentation with voltage control/restrained functionality.

Voltage during Loss of Synchronism

Let us assume the simple system shown in Fig. 14. We will assume that the generator slips a pole and analyze the circuit to determine the voltages and currents at the PCC.




Fig. 14. Simple System for Loss of Sync Analysis

We are ignoring load in this figure. To analyze the circuit under the presence of load, see reference [2], which analyzes Fig. 14 in detail and also includes facility loads.

Let us use V_{Sys} as the fixed voltage and rotate the generator voltage phasor around by 360° . The voltage at the PCC will be:

$$\begin{aligned} V_{PCC} &= V_{Sys} - Z_{Sys} I_{Sys} = V_{Sys} - Z_{Sys} \left(\frac{V_{Sys} - V_{Gen}}{Z_{Sys} + Z_{Gen}} \right) \\ &= V_{Sys} - k(V_{Sys} - V_{Gen}) \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

where

$$k = \left(\frac{Z_{Sys}}{Z_{Sys} + Z_{Gen}} \right)$$

A k value of 0.5 will indicate the PCC is at the electrical impedance center. If $0.5 < k < 1$ then the generator impedance is smaller than the system impedance, and if $0 < k < 0.5$ the generator impedance is larger than the system impedance.

A graphical picture that helps give a feel for the significance of this equation is seen in Fig. 15. Note in Fig. 15 that if the PCC is near the electrical impedance center, then a very low voltage will be seen at the PCC for each slip cycle, but if the PCC is remote from the electrical impedance center, the voltage drop seen at the PCC might be difficult to sense.




Fig. 15. V_{PCC} for Varying k as Generator Slips Pole

There is some difficulty in stating the apparent impedance of a generator during a pole slip event. This paper takes the generally accepted view (which is in agreement with generator simulation tests performed at the Basler factory) that the transient reactance, X_D' , is a reasonable representation of the generator impedance during a pole slip event, falling in the 0.3pu range. During a slow pole slip, when a slip cycle

exceeds twice the X_D' time constant (typically about 0.3 second time frame), it would be anticipated that the apparent generator impedance will start to increase somewhat.

Let us look at our sample system in Fig. 14. The generator was rated at half the system load, so its effective impedance at the base of 1.0 PU will be $X_D' = 0.6pu$. A power system that is capable of delivering 1pu current with good voltage regulation likely has a fault duty on the order of 10 times the load current level, so we might assume X_{Sys} of around 0.1pu, which is reasonable considering a 5% impedance facility transformer and a long line to the facility. In any case, the generator impedance is notably higher than the system impedance and k has a value of about 0.14 in this case. If a generator is used that could support the full facility load, k would have been about 0.25. Per Fig. 7, $k=0.25$ indicates only a 50% voltage dip at the PCC, and at $k=0.14$, the voltage will drop to about 78% of nominal.

Let us call the undervoltage element that we want to sense the out of step condition a 27T-3/3 (T indicates the 27 is a definite time delay element, and 3/3 indicates all 3 phases must be low for a trip). Some issues that need consideration when setting the 27T-3/3 are:

1. The minimum voltage that will be seen at the PCC during a pole slip needs to be determined. See (15) and Ref. [2] as a starting point. The PU setting for 27T-3/3 element needs to be less than the worst case voltage drop that will occur during load inrush at the facility. Load inrush should not cause more than 20% voltage drop in most facilities, so a setting of 75% of nominal may be appropriate. Hence, the voltage during a loss of sync condition might be insufficiently low to reliably differentiate from low voltage due to normal events. This issue may prevent the ability of the 27 to detect loss of synchronism.
2. The low voltage at the PCC for a pole slip will be seen on all 3 phases, so to help differentiate the pole slip from a temporary fault, the element should monitor for all phases going low.
3. The 27T-3/3 should be time delayed only a matter of cycles. If the PCC is at the electrical impedance center where $k=0.5$, V_{PCC} will transiently approach 0V and will be below 0.5pu for only about 1/3 of the slip cycle. Assuming the slip is 1 pole slip per second, this gives a low voltage for around 20 cycles. If the PCC is not at the electrical center, the minimum low voltage will be higher than 0V and the low voltage condition will last a shorter time. If the slip was faster, there would be even less time for the relay to respond. Time delay may need to be as low as 5 cycles, if the voltage dip can be sensed at all.
4. The 27-3/3 could be fooled by external events that deliberately remove power at the PCC, so an input to the relay to block operation for such conditions may be necessary.
5. If the breaker is opened at the moment of lowest PCC voltage, then the breaker will try to interrupt current with the generator and system 180° out of phase and with twice the system voltage across the breaker at the

moment after current is interrupted. It may be advisable to delay tripping until the 27-3/3 element drops out.

Current during Loss of Synchronism

The current that will flow in the circuit in Fig. 6 during an out of step condition can be approximated by the equation:

$$I_{PCC} = \frac{V_{Sys} - V_{Gen}}{Z_{Sys} + Z_{Gen}} \quad (16)$$

$$I_{PCC, Peak} \approx \frac{2}{Z_{Sys} + Z_{Gen}}$$

This current does not reflect the load flow that will be superimposed on top of these currents. Again, see [2] for a more detailed analysis, and see earlier discussion on the use of X_D' . From the previous discussion, let us assume $Z_{Sys} = 0.1pu$ and $Z_{Gen} = X_D' = 0.6pu$ after converting to our common base. This gives a peak current of around 2.9pu. If a generator had been used that could have supported the entire facility, $X_{Gen} = 0.3$, then the peak current would be around 5pu. Let us call an overcurrent element that we want to sense the out of step condition a 50T-3/3 (T indicates the 50 is a definite time delay element, and 3/3 indicates all 3 phases must be high for a trip). Some issues that need consideration when setting the 50T-3/3 are:

1. The peak current for an out of step condition needs to be determined, and the peak load and/or transformer inrush as seen at the relay location needs to be determined. The pickup setting for 50T-3/3 element needs to be about 75% or less of the peak out of step current (= 2.1pu for our small generator case and 3.75pu for our large generator case). We also need the pickup to be at least 125% or more of the worst case load/transformer inrush at the facility (maybe 2pu in this example). For the small generator case, we have a marginal condition. On a case-by-case basis, these pickup setting requirements may very well conflict with one another. If the conflict arises, either i) external logic must be used to block the relay element for load inrush conditions, or ii) the relay should be put at the generator terminals and should be set based upon peak load inrush as seen at the generator, rather than at the PCC.
2. Pole slip currents can be seen better at the generator terminals rather than at the PCC. In facilities with smaller generators, the load current flow at the PCC may mask the pole slip condition. Further, generators are not typically exposed to load currents above 1.5pu, which makes for easier discrimination between load current and loss of synchronism current.
3. The high current for a pole slip will be seen on all 3 phases, so to help differentiate a pole slip from a fault, the element should monitor for all phases going high. A positive sequence overcurrent current element, 50-I1, would not be appropriate since phase to phase and phase to ground faults can cause high I1.
4. The 50T-3/3 should operate in a matter of cycles. Just as in the voltage dip discussions, the current level will

oscillate from 0 to IPCC,Peak and back to 0 in one slip cycle and will be above about 2/3 of IPCC,Peak for only about 1/3 of the slip cycle. For a 1 second slip rate, a pickup of 2pu current, and a peak current of 2.9pu, the relay will be picked up for less than 20 cycles. If the slip was faster, there would be proportionately less time for the relay to respond. A delay of 5-10 cycles may be appropriate.

5. If the breaker is opened at the moment of highest current, the breaker will try to interrupt current with the generator and system 180° out of phase and with twice the system voltage across the breaker at the moment after current is interrupted. It may be advisable to delay tripping until the 50T-3/3 element drops out.

The 67_{POS} during Loss of Synchronism

The above equations for current and voltage at the PCC can be combined to create equations for the apparent impedance during the loss of synchronism.

$$Z_{PCC} = \frac{V_{PCC}}{I_{PCC}} = \frac{V_{Sys} - Z_{Sys} \left(\frac{V_{Sys} - V_{Gen}}{Z_{Sys} + Z_{Gen}} \right)}{\left(\frac{V_{Sys} - V_{Gen}}{Z_{Sys} + Z_{Gen}} \right)} \quad (17)$$

$$= \frac{V_{Sys} Z_{Gen} + V_{Gen} Z_{Sys}}{V_{Sys} - V_{Gen}}$$

The apparent Z_{PCC} will be lowest when V_{Gen} is 180° out of phase with V_{Sys} . The impedance takes a path shown in Fig. 16, seen in many resources. Fig. 16 includes the forward and reverse zones for the 67_{POS} element. At the point where the 67_{POS} sees reverse current, the generator voltage will be just past 180° out of phase, so current will still be high. If this is a facility that should not be sending large amounts of current to the utility, then we have a signature for out of step that we can monitor with what we will call a 67/50T-3/3. Some issues that need consideration when setting the 67/50T-3/3 are:

1. The peak current for an out of step condition needs to be determined, and the peak current that the facility will ever send out to the utility needs to be determined. Similar to the 50T-3/3, the 67/50T-3/3 pickup setting for 50T-3/3 element needs to be about 75% or less of the peak out of step current but, in this case, it only needs to be about 125% or more of the worst case “outrush” from the facility to the utility. Because the 67/50T-3/3 element is not turned on by the 67POS until the pole slip is just past its peak, a more sensitive pickup of 50% of peak current might be good, if possible.
2. Pole slip currents can be seen better at the generator terminals rather than at the PCC. In facilities with smaller generators, the load current flow at the PCC may mask the pole slip condition.
3. The high current for a pole slip will be seen on all 3 phases, so to help differentiate a pole slip from a fault, the element should monitor for all phases going high. A

positive sequence overcurrent current element, 50-I1, would not be appropriate since phase to phase and phase to ground faults can cause high I1.

4. The 67/50T-3/3 should operate in a matter of cycles. Because the element is not turned on by the 67POS until the pole slip is just past its peak, high speed operation is more important. At the turn-on point of the 67/50T-3/3, and given a 1 second slip cycle, the current may decay to below pickup in less than 10 cycles, and there would be even less time if the slip rate were higher. A 3-5 cycle delay would be appropriate. Of course, the faster one makes the relay, the more chance of a transient load swing or CT error causing a misoperation of the element.
5. If the breaker is opened at the moment of highest current, the breaker will try to interrupt current with the generator and system 180° out of phase and with twice the system voltage across the breaker at the moment after current is interrupted. It may be advisable to delay tripping until the 67/50T-3/3 element drops out.
6. The function can be augmented with voltage supervision, enabling the 67/50-3/3 only under 3 phase low voltage. This might be viewed as a form of a 51VR or 51VC relay. An element that uses a 51 may be too slow to sense a pole slip, so a very high speed 51 or a 50T is appropriate.




Fig. 16. Z_{PCC} during Pole Slip Event

X. APPLICATION NOTE 4: SENSITIVE GENERATOR GROUND FAULT DETECTION

For the smaller generators found in the DG environment that lack a current differential (87G) element, Fig. 17 shows a fairly fast and sensitive means of sensing a ground fault in a generator. In this logic, the 50TN and 150TN are set non-directional. Again, the T indicates that these are definite time elements. The elements start to operate on any ground current, but they are supervised by a directional element that picks up whenever there is ground current flowing out of the generator. The 50TN (the element on the phase CTs) needs to be time delayed enough to ride through false residual current that arises due to transient phase CT saturation that might be caused by high DC offset in phase currents during normal load energization or external faults. Both elements need to be delayed long enough for the 67ZERO to make a correct directional decision (e.g. ride through transient CT error). The

67ZERO needs to be any method that will sense out-of-generator faults and needs to be sensitive enough to correctly see the same faults as the 50TN and 150TN elements.




Fig. 17. Ground Fault Sensing Schematic

XI. APPLICATION NOTE 5: DIRECTION TO FAULT ON HIGH IMPEDANCE GROUNDED SYSTEMS

Some DG systems are run in an ungrounded or high impedance grounded mode behind a transformer that isolates the plant from the utility ground grid. In a system with a high impedance ground, the existence of a ground somewhere in the system is indicated by a high V_0 voltage and sensed by appropriate relaying, typically called a 59N relay. Once the fault is detected, the faulted phase will be indicated by a low V_{LG} on the faulted phase. However, when multiple feeders or generators are connected to the bus, the specific faulted feeder or generator is unknown.

Though small, there will be some capacitive ground current flow in the system through the fault. In Fig. 18, if feeder 3 has a ground fault, phase to ground capacitance on the unfaultered phases of feeders 1 and 2 will result in current flow into the ground fault. If enough capacitance is involved, the current may be detectable. A basic approach to determining which feeder is faulted is to simply look at the magnitude of the current involved on each feeder, and the one with the most current will be the faulted phase. This approach requires that at least three feeders be on the faulted bus. With only two feeders, the faulted feeder will see about the same current as the unfaultered feeder.




Fig. 18. Line to Ground Fault on High Z_G System

A smarter method to sense the faulted feeder is the 67/50G with the 67_{ZERO} in the $V_0 I_G$ mode. By comparing the phase relationship between the calculated V_0 and the measured I_0 , the relay can determine if there is a ground fault forward and hence on the feeder, or reverse and hence on another feeder.

This approach to sensing direction to the fault has its issues. In a high impedance grounded system, there can be some level standing offset in V_0 due to system unbalance Z_{LG} ; e.g., if phase A is always strung closer to ground than phase B and C, then $X_{Cap,LG}$ is lower on phase A. This will add a confusion factor to the unfaulted condition: "Is this measured V_0 due to a fault or is this due to the normal offset in my system?" If such a problem shows up, one should attempt to find the source of the standing unbalance and remove it, or one might mask it with a small ground bank. A VT connected in a broken delta arrangement with a resistor in the broken delta can act as a very small ground bank. One should calculate the ground bank impedance required before trying to use a broken delta VT so one does not find the effect too small.

Another issue is that if the phase to ground capacitance of the system is small (X_C large), there may not be enough current for the relay to work with. There are two issues: a) there needs to be sufficient current for the overcurrent element to operate, and b) there must be sufficient current for the 67_{ZERO} to determine direction to the fault. These issues are in part addressed by CT selection. Also, for the current level to be detectable, it will likely be necessary that the relay monitor a window CT that wraps all phases, that the CT ratio be low, and the ground input (I_g) of the relay be configured as a 1A input, rather than the more typical 5A input (U.S. market). Further, in some relays a sensitive earth fault (SEF) feature is available that makes the I_g input highly sensitive to current in the 10's of milliamps. One should study the relay manufacturer's instruction manuals for the minimum currents and voltages that are required for the 51/67G and 67_{ZERO} elements to operate.

One more issue that some may be concerned about is ground fault detection when the fault impedance itself is very high; possibly on the order of thousands of ohms of resistance. The fault resistance will make the V_0 neutral shift small and make the ground fault hard to sense, especially if there is any standing V_0 in the system due to unbalanced Z_{LG} in the system. The fault resistance also will turn capacitive current flow into a capacitive/resistive flow, so that instead of I_0 leading V_0 by 90° , it will lead by, for instance, 30° , and also reduce a small current into an even smaller current. If one is concerned about fault impedance, then the zero sequence MTA can be adjusted from 90° leading to some value closer to 30° leading, but outside of this option, one will need to look for specialized ground fault sensing relays or equipment.

XII. APPLICATION NOTE 6: DETECTING HIDDEN PHASE LOSS

Examine Fig. 19. In this case one phase feeding the DG has been lost, but due to generation on site, the matter is not easily detected simply from a voltage standpoint. It is likely that a fault occurred that caused this situation to arise, but somehow

the fault has cleared and the DG is left back feeding an unfaulted phase. One might make the argument that this situation would not likely occur, but that will not dissuade the concerned utility engineer that it is still possible and should be protected against.




Fig. 19. Phase Loss Condition with Generator on Line

The negative sequence directional element (67/51Q) at the PCC in this case may see high current unbalance. The load current will appear as a reverse phase to ground fault. The current and voltage unbalance may be enough for the 67_{NEG} or 67_{ZERO} to enable sensitive reverse looking overcurrent elements. Another element that will see the situation is a reverse looking 32 element. A 32 element set to monitor on a three phase basis will not see the situation, but a 32 element that is set to monitor power flow one phase at a time will sense the problem. The 32 element is usually settable to be highly sensitive, so it may be more able to sense the condition than a 67/51Q.

XIII. APPLICATION NOTE 7: UNBALANCED LOAD CONDITIONS CAUSE PICKUP OF DIRECTIONAL ELEMENT

In an industrial facility, there is a possibility of unbalanced loading that could result in sufficient negative or zero sequence current flow and voltage for the 67_{NEG} or 67_{ZERO} directional element bit to set. If forward is into the facility as in Fig. 6, the 67_{NEG} or 67_{ZERO} will be set as forward and this will turn on the forward version of the appropriate 67/51 elements. It would be anticipated that the 67/51P-Forward and 67/51G-Forward element pickup will be set above highest expected forward current conditions, so only turning on the forward direction bit set should not be a problem. Further, in such current conditions the 67_{POS} element is already set to forward due to high facility load current, and hence the 67/51P forward looking element is already enabled, so setting the negative sequence directional has not affected the matter. Therefore, the effect of the unbalanced load on the directional elements can be ignored in this case. One should think through this issue for one's facility.

XIV. APPLICATION NOTE 8: USING SETTING GROUPS TO CONFIGURE THE 67/51 FOR CHANGING SYSTEM CONDITIONS

In DGs with many possible modes of operation (e.g. Fig. 20), there are various conditions where it may be worthwhile to

consider different setting groups to change the performance of a relay at the PCC.

- A facility with multiple generators may operate the PCC with more or less generators on line. With increased generation on line, the current that the facility may feed into a utility fault will increase. Higher sensitivity may be required when only one generator is on line, and less sensitivity when three generators are on line and connected in parallel.
- With increased generation and the PCC being run closer to the float (0 power flow) point, the risk of transient reverse power flow increases. If there is risk of a sensitive reverse current relay from operation, some allowance may be needed for desensitizing the current relay when a large amount of generation is on line.
- If there are one or two breakers or transformers that connect the DG to the utility and the system might be run with either one or two transformers, or generation tied to either source, the 67/51 and relay logic may need to be modified appropriately for system conditions. For example, which breakers should be tripped for a reverse fault? Which generators?

Company of Colorado. In 1997 he began his present position as an Application Engineer for Basler Electric.




Fig. 20. DG with Many Possible Modes of Operation

IX. CONCLUSIONS

The paper discussed some of the variations in directional control that can be found in the relays on the market. When testing the relay, determining relay settings, or analyzing event reports, some concept of how the relay determines direction to a fault will be needed.

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- [2] "PoleSlip_R0.xls" spreadsheet to model voltages, currents, and power flow during a pole slip event. File is available at www.basler.com.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

John Horak (M,1987) received his BSEE in 1987 from the University of Houston and an MSEE in the field of power system analysis in 1995 from the University of Colorado. He has worked for Houston Lighting and Power, Chevron, and Stone and Webster Engineering, where he spent several years on assignment in the System Protection Engineering offices of Public Service



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